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Foreword 
The historic International Law Studies ("Blue Book" ) series was initiated by the Naval War College in 1901 to publish essays, treatises and articles that 
contribute to the broader understanding of international law. This, the eighty-
eighth volume of the "Blue Book" series, is a compilation of scholarly papers and 
remarks derived from the proceedings of a conference hosted at the Naval War 
College on June 21-23, 2011 entitled "Non-International Armed Conflict in the 
21st Century." 
The purpose of the June 20 11 International Law Conference was to examine 
the legal issues surrounding non-international armed conflict (NlAC) in the 
modern era. To this end, renowned international academics and legal advisers, 
both military and civilian, representing military, diplomatic, non-governmental 
and academic institutions from the global community, were invited to the War 
College to analyze a variety oflegal topics related to NIAC. Specifically, the panel-
ists undertook an examination of the types of NlACs and the law applicable to 
each; the legal statuses of actors in NlAC; means and methods of warfare in 
NIAC; recent and ongoing NIACs; detention in NIAC; and enforcement of inter-
national law in NlAC. In addition, the Honorable Harold H. Koh, Legal Adviser 
of the U.S. Department of State, presented a luncheon address at the Naval Sta-
tion Newport Officers' Club on the second day of the conference. 
The distinguished panelists were invited to contribute articles to this volume to 
further develop their thoughts offered at the conference, and this "Blue Book" is 
largely comprised of these articles. Readers and researchers will find within this 
volume a detailed study of the law pertaining to non-international armed conflicts 
as it is interpreted and applied in the post-September 11 world, and its effect on 
State actions, particularly military operations. 
The conference and the "Blue Book" were made possible with generous sup-
port from the Naval War College Foundation, the Israel Yearbook on Human 
Rights, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, and the Lieber Society 
on the Law of Armed Conflict, American Society ofInternational Law. 
On behalf of the Secretary of the Navy, the Ch ief of Naval Operations and 
the Co mmandant of the Marine Corps, I extend our thanks and gratitude to 
all the participants, contributing authors and editors for their invaluable contri-
butions to this project and to the future understanding of the law applicable in 
non-international armed conflicts, the predominant form of warfare during the 
last several decades and the type of conflicts in which military forces are most 
likely to be engaged in the twenty-first century. 
JOHN N. CHRlSTENSON 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy 
President, Naval War College 
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Introduction 
D uring the past half century, non-international armed conflicts have far outnumbered those that are international in character. Indeed, as the con-
ference that provided the basis for this volume was underway, the United States 
was engaged with its NATO allies in a non-international armed conflict in Afghan-
istan and was winding down its long participation in one in Iraq. The nation was 
also "at war" with various transnational terrorist groups in what many characterize 
as non-international armed conflict. 
Yet, the lex scripta governing international armed conflict dwarfs that address-
ing non-international armed conflict. Moreover, although international tribunals 
have handled many cases involving the latter, their decisions often prove contro-
versial, especially when applying the law of international armed conflict to non-
in ternational conflicts. Unfortunately, even the academic community pays less 
attention to the law of non-international armed conflict than merited by its legal 
complexity and the frequency and human consequences of the conflicts to which 
it applies. 
This reality is unsurprising. International armed conflict self-evidently affects 
international stability. As history has demonstrated time and again, the risks of 
escalation and of spread are high whenever such conflicts occur. These and other 
facto rs motivate the members of the international community to agree upon 
norms limiting the effects of State-on-State conflict lest they find themselves in-
volved therein. In doing so, States not only accept limitations on their battlefield 
actions, but also secure protection for, j"fer alia, their civilians, civilian property 
and soldiers lIors de combat. The key to the system is the reciprocity inherent in the 
treaty and customary law regimes that encompass opposing belligerents. Since the 
law of international anned conflict is more robust than its non-international coun-
terpart, so too is the attention paid it. 
Non-international armed conflict is of a fundamentally different nature. In 
most cases, States are facing organized groups oflawbreakers from whom reciproc-
ity cannot be expected. Therefore, there is often little incentive for States to limit 
their scope of action by agreeing to legal norms with which only they will abide. 
Moreover, as the conflict is "internal," the risk of spread is limited, while the in -
volvement of other States is a matter of their discretion. 
However, the context in which non-international anned conflict occurs is un-
dergoing transformation. Transnational terrorism has become a globally pervasive 
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phenomenon, one that the international community seems increasingly willing to 
classify as non-international, at least to the extent it rises to the level of "armed 
conflict" as a matter oflaw. Further, as illustrated by the conflicts in the Balkans, 
Afghanistan and the Great Lakes region of Africa, the likelihood of spillover into 
neighboring countries is very real, especially when a conflict is ethnically or reli-
giously based or when adjacent territory is poorly governed. And the rise of crimi-
nal groups with capabilities equaling those of government forces, as in Colombia 
and Mexico, raises the question of whether the hostili ties they engage in qualify as 
armed conflict. 
The International Law Department of the Naval War College, long noted for 
exploring new legal challenges in its annual conferences, accordingly decided that 
a closer examination of the law governing non-international armed conflict was 
opportune. Held in June 201 1, the resulting conference brought together many of 
the key legal practitioners and scholars in the field to consider both the state of the 
law and where it might be headed. Certain of the participants were invited to 
expand on their presentations in this volume, the eighty-eighth in the Naval War 
College's International Law Studies ("Blue Books") series. It delves into such com-
plicated topics as the scope of non-international armed conflict, the legal status of 
actors, specific limitations on methods and means of warfare, detention and en-
forcement. The volume also offers several firsthand descriptions of particular 
non-international armed conflicts. Hopefully, the various contributions will assist 
those tasked with providing legal advice d uring future non-international armed 
conflicts, as well as make a measurable contribution to the scholarship on the 
subject. 
Appreciation is owed to many who made the conference and this volume of the 
"Blue Books" possible. Rear Admiral John Christenson, President of the Naval 
War College, and Ambassador Mary Ann Peters, its Provost, provide the leadership 
that enables the International Law Department to undertake these cutting-edge 
studies. Professor Robert "Barney" Rubel, Dean of the Center for Naval Warfa re 
Studies, consistently affords the International Law Department the material sup-
port necessary to engage in meaningful research, as well as the vision that under-
girds all of its activities. Professor Dennis Mandsager, fo rmer Chairman of the 
International Law Department, was at the helm as the Department developed the 
topic and executed the conference. Lieutenant Colonel George Cadwalader ably 
selVed as Conference Director, an oft-thankless duty, but one that is the key to suc-
cess. Finally, Brigadier General Kenneth Watkin, Canadian Forces (Ret.), the War 
College's 20 11- 12 Stockton Professor of International Law, and Captain Andrew 
Norris, U.S. Coast Guard, edited this important volume with substantive aplomb 
and editorial finesse. They are to be congratulated. 
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The Naval War College has engaged in international law study and writing since 
the late nineteenth century. Indeed, the first volwne of the "Blue Book" series was 
authored in 1901 by Professor lohn Bassett Moore, who would go on to serve as the 
first U.S. judge on the Permanent Court of International Justice. It is our commit-
ment to continue this proud tradition in the years to come. 
PROFESSOR MICHAEL N. SCHMITI 
Chairman, International Law Department 




From June 21 to 23, 2011, the U.S. Naval War CoUege hosted distinguished in-ternational scholars and practitioners. both military and civilian, repre-
senting government and academic insti tutions, to participate in a conference 
examining the evolving law in non-international armed conflict (NIAC) in the 
twenty-first century. Panelists discussed their views on how the law will develop as 
the world continues to struggle with the changing nature of the threats to national 
and international security posed by failed and failing States, insurgencies. and 
transnational criminal and terrorist organizations. The conference featured open-
ing, luncheon and dosing addresses, as well as six panel discussions. 
The conference swnmary that follows was prepared by Commander Christian 
P. Fleming, JAGC, U.S. Navy, a member of the Navy Reserve unit that supports the 
Naval War College's International Law Department. The summary recapitulates 
the highlights of each conference speaker's presentation. As co-editors, we are 
deeply indebted to Commander Fleming for his attention to detail and assistance 
in facilitating the publication of this "Blue Book." We would also be remiss if we 
did no t thank Captain Ralph Thomas, JAGC, U.S. Navy (Ret.), for his outstanding 
support and dedication in editing the submissions for this volwne of the In terna-
tional Law Studies series. We also extend our sincere appreciation to Susan Meyer 
ofthe Naval War College's Desktop Publishing Division for expertly preparing the 
page proofs. Additionally, we would like to thank Albert Fassbender and Shannon 
Cole for their excellent work in proofreading the conference papers. The quality of 
this volume is a re tlection of their professionalism and outstanding expertise. 
This "Blue Book" would not have come to fruition had it not been fo r the enor-
mously successful conference made possible in large measure by the conference 
committee under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel George Cadwalader, U.S. 
Marine Corps, working with Mrs. Jayne Van Petten of the International Law De-
partment, and the support provided by the Naval War College Foundation, the In-
ternational Institute ofH umanitarian Law, the Lieber Society on the Law of Armed 
Conflict (American Society of International Law) and the Israel Yearbook on Hu-
man Rights. We thank these individuals and organizations for their end uring sup-
port and generosity. 
We hope that the thought-provokingartides published in this "Blue Book" will 
add to-and help shape-the debate on the multiple complex emerging legal is-
sues presented by the changing character of war. The insights offered to legal 
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practitioners and scholars should assist them as they address these and other issues 
that may evolve in future conflicts. 
Opening Address 
Professor Ken Watkin delivered the opening address. After introductory remarks, 
Professor Watkin began his discussion of law in NlAC by quoting Colonel 
Caldwell, who in 1906 defined a form ofNlAC known as "small wars" as being 
"campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellion and guerilla warfare in all parts of 
the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not 
meet them in the open field." The 1940 Small Wars Manual of the U.S. Marine 
Corps indicated that "small wars represent the normal and frequent operations of 
the Marine Corps." 
Because States have been hostile to clarifying the law, there has been limited suc-
cess in articulating the law ofNIAC. The concern is that non-State actors will be 
given legitimacy. Given the lack of consensus on what law applies to small war, a di-
alogue has been left open as to how and to what degree human rights law governs 
the use of force, the treatment of detainees and the accountability process in 
NIACs. Gaps remain and the law governing N1AC needs to be clarified for a num-
ber of reasons. 
First, NlACs have been and will remain the dominant form of warfare. NlACs 
will not disappear and pure international wars are becoming rare. International 
armed conflicts (lACs) can change to NlACs overnight. This occurred in Afghani-
stan. Did troops on the ground notice the change? Did the legal advice change? As a 
result, for most practitioners the key question to be asked is whether there is an 
armed conflict rather than whether it is lAC or NlAC. Ironically, the Lieber Code, 
written during the American Civil War, a NlAC, was a starting point for codifying 
rules in an armed conflict. Unfortunately, the law applied in NIACs has become 
muddier since then. 
Second, the lack of clarity regarding the law ofNlAC can have a profound and 
sometimes negative effect not only on the victims of conflict, but also on States in 
terms of whether their actions are viewed as being legitimate. For example, in post-
9/11 detainee operations, the dialogue would have been much different jfthere had 
been greater clarity in the law. An application of the policy oftreating captured per-
sonnel under prisoner of war standards, without providing that status, or as secu-
rity detainees under Geneva Convention IV could have been a practical, defensible 
and ultimately helpful approach. However, even today, an internationally agreed-
upon framework governing detainees in NIAC is lacking. 
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Third, there is a belief that the law applicable to NlAC has no real relevance to 
conflicts between States. However, there can be significant cross-poUination ofle-
gal issues, such as when dealing with an insurgency during belligerent occupation. 
Finally, the unwillingness of States to clarify what law applies to NIAC has nega-
tively impacted their ability to influence how that law is being shaped. Gaps, both 
real and perceived, are being filled by restatements and manuals of international 
organizations instead of by States. One example is the International Committee of 
the Red Cross's 20091nterpretive Guidance on the Norion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities, which deals with an issue that States appear to have been either unwill-
ing or unable to address. The Guidance is representative of a trend suggesting that 
States should be held to a higher standard than their non-State opponents. Adding 
new inequity to the existing law is not likely to aid in reaching consensus among 
such significant stakeholders in intemational law as States. 
At the same time, States cannot complain about new manuals if they do not get 
fully engaged in the processes being used to clarify the law. Civilians must be pro-
tected and the question is the degree to which States want to influence that process. 
Panel I: Types ofNlACs and Applicable Law 
Panel I, moderated by Commander James Kraska, JAGC, U.S. Navy, of the Naval 
War College's International Law Department, consisted of Mr. David Graham of 
the US. Army's Judge Advocate General 's Legal Center and School, Professor 
Geoffrey Corn of South Texas College of Law, Professor Charles Garraway of the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) and Mr. Karl Chang of 
the U.S. Department of Defense Office of General Counsel. 
Mr. Graham established the framework for the discussion by posing these ques-
tions: Howdo we recognize a NIAC? Are there differe nt types ofNlAC? How does 
the United States decide whether a NIAC exists or not? Mr. Graham commented 
that the law of armed conflict (LOAC) provides no definition of NlAC, nor does 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. It is not clear what level of 
violence must exist and how protracted that violence needs to be for there to be a 
NIAG States have been reluctant to recognize NLACs within their own borders for 
fear of legitimizing belligerent groups. Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions does not aid in defining NIAC; Additional Protocol II (AP II) nar-
rows the number ofNLACs to which it would apply. The U.S. practice would ap-
pear to be that of making no official determination as to whether a NIAC exists, 
but, instead, to state that all U.S. personnel involved in a conflict will comply with 
LOAC, regardless of how such a conflict might be characterized. While perhaps 
self-selVing, this is a practical approach with a proven track record. 
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Professor Corn focused on the issue of willful blindness in conflict determina-
tion and why this is a dangerous approach. When States invoke powers under 
LOAC-namely, to kill and detain-then States should be estopped from neglect-
ing to provide protections under Common Article 3. Said differently, if a State is 
going to use the tools of war, then it m ust be bound by the rules of war. When a 
State enters an armed conflict, it cannot label it as a NlAC or lAC to game the system. 
Turning to the U.S. conflict against al Qaeda, Professor Corn believes the Bush ad-
ministration attempted to use a gap in the law to justify an exception to Common 
Article 3. The United States attempted to use the inherent right of self-defense to 
justify the use of force, but pretended to not need to address jus in bello consider-
ations. There was willful blindness to suggest that when invoking self-defense, the 
question of the legal framework governing the conflict did not have to be 
addressed. 
Professor Garraway spoke from the European standpoint, and addressed the 
border between law enforcement and NIAG Prior to 1949, there was either war or 
peace. In 1949, everything changed, and the spectrum of violence over the last fifty 
to sixty years has been like a rainbow, with difficulty in determining where the col-
ors merge. The main issue for many years was the line between NIAC and lAC, but 
the underlying problem is determining the line between law enforcement and 
NIAG Human rights law and LOAC are reasonably compatible insofar as "prohi-
bitions" are concerned. The problem comes with the "permissions" inherent in 
"Hague law" on the conduct of hostilities. The challenge is that ifhuman rights law 
and LOAC are not to collide, there need to be compromises where they differ, such 
as in targeting. There is a need to know what law applies in which circumstances. 
The answer might lie in the intensity of the violence. Where the intensity is similar 
to lAC, LOAC has priority; where the level is less, human rights law has priority. 
Mr. Chang observed that people are troubled by a dearth oflaw pertaining to 
NIAG He argued that attempts to fill this perceived void by drawing from human 
rights law or from law relating to lAC were unpersuasive and often an exercise in 
applying law to situations for which it was not intended. Instead, Mr. Chang pro-
posed that the law of neutrality, which governs the relations between belligerents 
and neutrals, gave principled limits on transnational NlACs. In lAC, we know 
whom we are fighting and where we want to fight . But in transnational NIAC, the 
fighting often takes place in neutral or non-belligerent States against citizens of 
such States. The framework of neutrali ty law is needed to detennine when persons 
have forfeited their neutral immunity and acquired enemy status. Similarly, neu-
trality law is needed to determine where the State may use force, i.e., when other 
States are unable or unwilling to address threats emanating from their territories. 
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Panel II: Legal Status of Actors in NlAC 
The International Law Department's Commander Andrew Norris, U.S. Coast 
Guard, moderated this panel, which consisted of Durham University professor 
Michael Schmitt, Creighton University School of Law professor Sean Watts and 
Mr. Stephen Pomper of the U.s. Department of State. The panel delved into the legal 
status of actors in NIAC, focusing on the categorization of those fighting for and 
against the State. Me. Pomper commented on various U.S. legal policy positions re-
garding NIAC. 
Professor Schmitt discussed the law pertaining to opposition forces in NIAC, 
noting that treaty law directly on point is sparse. A threshold issue is determining 
whether the persons are actually members of the opposition or mere1y individual 
criminals or members of criminal gangs taking advantage of the instability that ex-
ists during conflict. The latter cannot be parties to the conflict unless they are act-
ing in support of rebel forces, and operations conducted against them are governed 
by domestic and human rights law. Professor Schmitt cautioned, however, that 
there is a possible change in the wind for well-organized anned criminal gangs 
competing with the State for control and authority over territory when the State 
must resort to the military in response. As to opposition forces in a NlAC, the easi-
est case is that of dissident armed forces, which are dearly targetable at all times. 
Other groups must display some level of structure and coordination and engage in 
"armed" actions (or support thereot) against the State before attaining the status of 
an "organized armed group," that is, a party to the conflict and therefore subject to 
targeting as such. Individuals who act against the State without membership in an 
organized armed group may qualify as "direct participants in hostilities" depend-
ing on the nature of their activities. When they qualify, they become targetable for 
such time as they participate in the conflict. Professor Schmitt argued that if they 
engage in recurring acts of hostility, their targetability extends throughout the 
period of the acts. 
Professor Watts addressed the status of government forces in NIAC, and clari-
fied that "status" was being discussed in the classic sense as combatant status, i.e., 
one's exposure to hostilities and one's authority to engage in hostili ties. Initially, 
Professor Watts observed that States have not turned to international law to define 
the status of government forces in NlAC. There is no customary international law 
in this area and very little by way of treatment in scholarly journals. States have not 
seen a need for international law to speak to the issue of government forces in 
NlAC, because they are committed to domestic law in this area and have generally 
been reluctant to commit NIAC issues to international law. Additionally, there is a 
lack of consensus among States as to the law applicable to NlAC. However, NIAC 
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law is changing. It is possible to imagine a future where some States-and perhaps 
tribunals-recognize rules regulating participation of government forces in NIAC 
Although NIAC rules are often developed by analogy from rules of lAC, the more 
likely source fo r such a rule would be some derivation of the existing NlAC rule of 
distinction. Professor Watts suggested, however, that such a rule would be ineffec-
tive in addressing the traditional concerns of distinction. The real concern with 
government forces' participation in NIAC is their conduct rather than their legal 
status. Ultimately, this exercise requires a choice between conceiving of combatant 
status as a gateway to protections and obligations and conceiving of status in purely 
political tenns. This forces a more theoretical consideration of jus in bello than 
usual. 
Mr. Pomper noted that the rules governing actors in NlAC are less developed 
than in lAC Often NIAC rules are drawn from their analogs in lAC and translated 
into the NlAC context, but this exercise can be difficult. There are identity and sta-
tus issues at the center of this exercise. Parallels exist between NlAC and lAC, but it 
is difficult to categorize the actors in NlAC the same way we do in lAC How this is 
defined has important implications for life and liberty, and has great operational 
significance for warfighters. There appears to be growing consensus among the 
United States and like-minded countries that there are two primary ways an indi-
vidual becomes liable to attack in a NIAC The first is ifhe is a member of an orga-
nized armed group; the second is if he is a civilian who directly participates in 
hostili ties, whether or not a member of an organized armed group. An individual 
who is a member of an organized armed group can be attacked at any time. By 
contrast, a civilian who directly participates in hostilities loses protection only for 
the duration of the participation. There also appears to be growing support for the 
concept that to detennine whether there is direct participation in hostilities, the 
nature of the harm, causation and a nexus to the hostilities must be considered. 
Panel III: Means and Methods in NIAC 
Lieutenant Colonel George Cadwalader Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, of the Interna-
tional Law Department, moderated this panel, which discussed means and meth-
ods in NlAC The panel consisted of Air Commodore Bill Boothby of the Royal Air 
Force, Professor Dr. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg of Europa-Universitat 
Viadrinaand Mr. Dick Jackson, the Special Assistant to the U.S. Army Judge Advo-
cate General for Law of War Matters. 
Air Commodore Boothby opened the panel by posing the question whether 
there is a meaningful distinction between the weapons laws that apply during lAC 
and NlAC First examining the similarities, he noted that the fundamental 
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principles of superlluous injury/unnecessary suffering and the prohibition of 
weapons that are indiscriminate by nature apply equally in both types of conflict. 
AP II applies to both, as do the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological 
Weapons Convention, the Ottawa Convention and the Cluster Munitions Con-
vention. However, there is an issue raised by expanding bullets. While treaty law 
bans the use of expanding bullets in lAC, it is questionable whether this is custom-
aryinternationallaw. The Kampala Review Conference for the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) added the offense of employing expanding 
bullets to those that could be committed in NIAC, but only if they are employed to 
"uselessly aggravate suffering." Thus, expanding bullets seem to represent a point 
of distinction between the laws applicable to lAC and NIAC. In the former, the of-
fense is not tied to superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering; in the latter it is. 
While the general trend has been convergence in the weapons laws of these two 
classes of conilict, achieving complete convergence would require State action and 
adjustment of some legal interpretations. 
Professor Dr. Heintschel von Heinegg focused on naval means of warfare in 
NIAC. Until the 19905 there were not many rules in NIAC related to means and 
methods. The emerging trend is to expand treaty law applicable to NIAC through 
the terms of the treaty itself, i.e., the treaty provisions state that it applies in NlACs. 
However, those treaties that do not distinguish between lACs and NlACs have not 
become customary international law. If there is a merger between the law in lAC 
and that in NlAC, then it cannot be a one-way street. The law cannot just speak 
about protections, but must also address privileges, such as targeting. There have 
been some historical examples of naval components to NlACs, such as during the 
Spanish Civil War, and the Sri Lanka, Algerian and, more recently, Libyan con-
Ilicts. There are no substantive rules of international law prohibiting naval means 
and methods in NIAC. Within the State's territory, government forces can inter-
fere with international navigation. However, government forces cannot expand 
this principle to international waters. And, if non-State actors interfere with navi-
gation, the State must provide notice to international shipping. 
Me. Jackson remarked that the trend has been a collapsing of lAC rules into 
NIAC, driven largely by the warfighter on the ground who does not know when the 
situation shifts from an lAC toa NIAC. He then discussed perfidy in NIAC. Perfidy 
violates the principle of distinction. The most important part of perfidy under 
NIAC is feigning of civilian status. The Military Commissions Act requires a show-
ing of a violation of LOAC; perfidy may be charged as such a violation. 
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Panel IV: Recent and Ongoing NIACs 
This panel, moderated by NavaJ War College professor Pete Pedrozo, was comprised 
of Lieutenant General Raymundo Ferrer of the Philippine Armed Forces, Colonel 
Juan Carlos Gomez of the Colombian Air Force and Captain Rob McLaughlin of the 
Royal Australian Navy. Its focus was on recent and ongoing NlACs. 
General Ferrer focused on the two major insurgent groups in the Philippines: 
the Maoist group and the Moro group. The Maoist group, consisting of the Com-
munist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, operates nationwide and is 
the longest-running Maoist insurgency in the world. The Moro group operates 
primarily in the southern Philippines, and consists of three major groups: the 
Moro National Liberation Front, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu 
Sayyaf Group. General Ferrer opined that the NlAC in the Philippines is a cry for 
human security. 
Colonel Gomez discussed the forty-five years of internal conflict in Colombia. 
He stated there are three groups of illegal armed actors: the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Columbia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN) and paramili-
tary forces that have become criminal gangs. Colonel Gomez described the diffi-
culty in the new operational environment that consists of human rights law on one 
side and international humanitarian law on the other, with the government's effort 
to combat terrorism and organized crime operating, depending on the circum-
stances, under one or the other of these tw"o norms. Essentially, human rights law 
provides the framework in territory controlled by the government and interna-
tional humanitarian law applies where the organized armed groups control. The 
dichotomy is that under human rights law, where there is typical criminal violence, 
the use of force is governed by restrained law enforcement standards, including 
self-defense. Under international humanitarian law, where there is a high level of 
violence, the concepts of military necessity, military objective, distinction, human-
ity and proportionality apply. The nature and location of the operation determine 
whether government forces are operating under law enforcement-type rwes of en-
gagement (ROE) or the more robust ROE applicable to traditional military 
operations. 
Captain Mclaughlin analyzed Australia's experience in East Timor, which he 
described as a high-end law enforcement operation, and contrasted it with the 
Australian experience in Afghanistan, which was a NIAC. He stated that whether a 
conflict is classified as law enforcement, a NlAC or an lAC is important because 
under a law enforcement scenario, lethal force can be used for self-defense, but in 
NIAC and lAC, the LOAC principles govern the use of force. He opined that Af-
ghanistan has clearly been a NIAC since 2005 and that there was little political or 
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strategic risk in classifying it as such, especially since the Taliban are seen to have 
few redeeming features. However, East Timor was, for political and strategic rea-
sons as much as legal reasons, classified as a law enforcement action, in large part 
because the intervening force was invited in by Indonesia and shared responsibility 
for security with Indonesia. The decision on how to characterize a conflict impacts 
ROE, determining whether there are attack or only self-defense ROE in place with 
respect to lethal force. While self-defense ROE are the same under both labels, mis-
sion accomplishment ROE are where they differ. He indicated that there is li ttle 
practical difference between NIAC and law enforcement insofar as detention rwes 
are concerned. 
Luncheon Address 
The Honorable Harold Koh, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, presented a 
luncheon address entitled "International Law and Armed Conflict in the Obama 
Administration." Mr. Koh opined that there was an emerging ObamalClinton 
doctrine that espoused four principles: (1) principled engagement, (2) diplomacy 
as an element of smart power, (3 ) strategic multilateralism and (4) compliance 
with the rules of domestic and international law. 
Mr. Koh stated that the United States is deeply committed to applying all ap-
plicable law, including LOAC, in its non-international armed conflict with al 
Qaeda with respect to both targeting and detention. Under domestic law, the au-
thority to detain stems from the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), 
as informed by the laws of war. Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II to 
the Geneva Conventions, as well as the Supreme Court of the United States, all 
contemplate that parties may lawfully detain belligerents to prevent them from 
returning to the battlefield. Once detained, all persons in U.S. custody must be 
treated humanely, and the administration has taken a number of steps to ensure 
that detainees in U.S. custody are treated humanely in accordance with our do-
mestic and international legal obligations. The United States has unequivocally af-
firmed that it will not engage in torture and has affirmed that current U.S. military 
practices are consistent with Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions 
and with Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, including 
the rules within these instruments that parallel the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. 
He further stated that the United States complies with all applicable law in its 
targeting practices. The United States is in an armed conflict with al Qaeda, the 
Taliban and associated forces, and may also use force consistent with the inherent 
right of self-defense. Congress has authorized force through the AUMF. Osama 
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bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, clearly had an ongoing operational role and his 
activities posed an imminent threat against the United States. There can be no 
question that he was the leader of an enemy force and a legitimate target in our 
armed conflict with al Qaeda. Moreover, the operation against him was conducted 
in a manner consistent with LOAC, including with the principles of distinction 
and proportionality, and in accordance with U.S. domestic law. 
Turning to Libya, Mr. Koh stated that there was a call to international action by 
the Arab League and NATO, and the use of force to protect civilians was authorized 
by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter because the situ-
ation within Libya threatened international peace and security. US. actions were 
consistent with the War Powers Resolution in these particular circumstances, spe-
cifically as follows: (1) the U.S. mission was limited in nature, duration and 
scope-with the shift to an explicit support role by the U.S. forces as part of a 
NATO-led multilateral civilian protection operation; (2) the exposure of U.S. 
forces was limited, involving no U.S. casualties or threat of significant U.S. casual-
ties and no sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces; (3) the 
risk of escalation was limited, with no U.S. military forces on the ground; and (4) 
the military means used were limited, the ordnance dropped being a fraction of 
that used in Kosovo. Mr. Koh posed the question: Did Congress in 1973, when it 
enacted the War Powers Resolution asan attempt to prevent future Vietnam Wars, 
intend that it also interrupt a mission-limited in nature, duration and scope--
launched to stop the slaughter of innocent civilians, as was the mission in Libya? 
Mr. Koh concluded by remarking that the administration has tried to square its 
emerging national security policies with the need for interoperability with allies 
and coalition partners who are parties to the ICC and duster munitions and land-
mines treaties. 
Panel V: Detention in NIAC 
This panel was moderated by Lieutenant Colonel Eric Young, JA, U.S. Army, of 
the International Law Department, and consisted of Brigadier General Thomas 
Ayres, JA, U.S. Army, Lieutenant Commander Kovit Talasophon of the Royal Thai 
Navy; Dr. Knut Dormann, of the International Committee of the Red Cross; and 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; Rule of Law and Detainee Policy, William 
Lietzau. 
General Ayres addressed the role of detainee operations in NIAC. He noted that 
legal authority existed to detain insurgents in a NIAC to keep them out of the fight 
until the cessation of hostilities. He noted, however, that based upon his experi-
ences in Iraq, there are four types of insurgents: (1) those acting for a criminal 
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purpose, e.g., to steal; (2) those who oppose the presence of coalition forces and 
attempt to demonstrate to the civilian populace that the occupying force is incapa-
ble of keeping civilians safe; (3) those who oppose the government and seek to dis-
credit it; and (4) foreign fighters who may be training to engage in terrorist activities 
and pose a threat to the national security interest of the United States or other coali-
tion nations. 
The first type of insurgent, those with a criminal purpose, would, in almost 
all phases of the conflict, be turned over to the government of Iraq to be tried in 
the domestic criminal courts. With regard to the remaining categories of insur-
gents, the coalition forces' objective was to detain only the worst of the worst, be-
cause, for operational reasons and due to "insurgent math," it was impossible to 
detain all potential "bad actors." The operational realities drove the coalition to 
evidence-based detention. Moreover, once the UN Securi ty Council resolution 
providing authority for the presence of coalition forces in Iraq neared expiration, 
the coalition began transferring detainees to the Iraqi government. In preparation 
for that transfer, the coalition sought to assist in the maturation of the Iraqi gov-
ernment institutions in their implementation of the rule of law by increasingly 
complying with Iraqi law and respecting Iraq's criminal law as the basis for de-
taining insurgents. General Ayres asserted that the coalition's efforts in modeling 
adherence to a criminal law paradigm to detain insurgents should not be seen as 
undercutting the international humanitarian law basis for detaining insurgents in 
a NIAC. 
Lieutenant Commander Talasophon reviewed Thailand's experience with de-
tention in what he characterized as "almost a civil war" with communist groups 
during the Cold War and in border wars with its neighbors. He indicated that there 
are ongoing hostilities in the southern portions of Thailand between the govern-
ment and those with political grievances. However, the Thai government has de-
clared that these hostilities are not a NIAC; therefore, they are dealt with through 
law enforcement operations. Domestic law has been used instead of international 
humanitarian law, although the government has complied with the spirit of Com-
mon Article 3 in conducting the operations. Detention is used to secure evidence 
and to ensure that the actor does not engage in further violence. 
Dr. Dormann spoke on the legal framework of detention in NlAC. He began 
with a general obsenration that the sources of international law pertaining to de-
tention in NlAC consisted of Common Article 3, Articles 4 through 6 of AP II and 
customary international law. Next, he opined that it is now generally accepted that 
human rights law applies alongside international humanitarian law in situations of 
armed conflict, including, despite the view of some important dissenters like the 
United States, extraterritorially. Dr. Dormann discussed the rules on treatment in 
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detention, conditions of detention and fair trial rights, but focused his remarks on 
internment (Le., non -cr iminal detention). He indicated that internment cannot be 
used solely for interrogation purposes; nor can it be used as punishment for past 
acts. Internment may be resorted to if there are imperative reasons fo r security to 
do so, a standard which includes direct participation in hostilities. He stated that 
the status of those detained should be periodically reviewed to determine whether 
they are still a security threat. Dr. Dormann concluded by stating that there were 
gaps in the law of detention in NlAC and States should meet to discuss the legal 
framework to fill those gaps. 
Me. Lietzau obselVed that the United States used to not think about what law 
applied in NIAC, particularly with regard to those detained during the conflict. In 
fact, the United States' last experience with long-term detention was of prisoners of 
war captured during World War II. The law then was c1ear----enemy prisoners of 
war could be held until the end of the conflict. But twenty-first-century conflicts 
have changed. Now the war is not with another State, but with a non-State actor, al 
Qaeda. In the early period of this new type of war, the United States was accused of 
holding detainees indefinitely without providing a means of review to determine 
whether there was sufficient basis for the detention. Today, newly captured indi-
viduals are submitted to a Detainee Review Board. The Board, comprised of three 
field-grade military officers, reviews each individual 's detention for both legality 
and necessity of continued detention. The detainee receives expert assistance from 
a U.S. officer who is authorized access to all reasonably available information per-
taining to that detainee. This review is repeated periodically after the initial hear-
ing, which must take place within sixty days of arrival at the internment facili ty. 
Now some argue that the pendulum has swung too far, and that the United States is 
releasing detainees (some of whom have returned to the fight) too quickly. What is 
unarguable is that an indefinite detention without some form of process in these 
new wars will not be stomached. 
Panel VI: Enforcement in N IAC 
Panel VI, on enforcement in NIAC, was moderated by Colonel Darren Stewart, 
OBE, British Army, the Director of the Military Department of the International 
Institute of Humanitarian Law at San Remo, Italy. The panelists were Professor 
John Cerone, professor oflaw and Director, Center for International Law & Policy, 
New England Law I Boston; University of Essex professor Fran~oise Hampson; and 
Johns Hopkins University professor Ruth Wedgwood. 
Introducing the topic, Colonel Stewart remarked that there is little substantive 
black letter law applicable to NIAC when compared to the international 
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humanitarian law applicable to lAC. However, while the law in NlAC has gaps, it is 
applied day to day by practitioners on the ground. The question of enforcement 
brings the gaps in the law into sharp focus. 
Professor Cerone discussed enforcement issues in the context of the then-current 
situation in Libya. After reviewing the phases of the conflj ct, he discussed the legal 
regimes that applied to each phase, as well as how they related to each other. He 
stated that it is now widely accepted that international human rights law applies 
simultaneously with humanitarian law in internal armed confljcts. Even those 
States that object to simultaneous application in international or transnational 
armed conflicts do not object to the application of international human rights 
law in internal anned conflicts. He then focused on international criminal law and 
the Security Council referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC. As Libya is not a 
party to the ICC Statute, the Court will need to address issues of immunity and 
rlUllul11 crimen sine lege. The Court will have to ensure, in particular, that any 
crimes prosecuted are well established in customary international law. Professor 
Cerone indicated that twenty years ago it was debatable whether any violations of 
NIAC law gave rise to individual criminal responsibility in international law. The 
legal landscape has changed dramatically since that time. Nonetheless, he con-
cluded that it is clear that not all of the war crimes within the subject matter juris-
diction of the ICC have entered the corpus of customary law. 
Professor Hampson opined that in the past fifteen years the focus has been on 
criminal responsibility, with not enough focus on civil responsibility. The advan-
tages of a civil action are that the claim can be brought against a State without the 
need to identify the actual perpetrators, there is a lower standard of proof than in 
criminal cases and the victims have more control over the claims. Claims can be 
brought in the domestic courts of the State where the violation occurred and possi-
bly in the domestic courts of third-party States. Professor Hampson indicated that 
there is no international means of bringing a claim against a non-State actor, al-
though possibly arbitration could be used on an ad hoc basis. At the international 
level, the only way to proceed is to bring a claim against a State. Claims could be 
brought before the International Court of Justice or other human rights bodies. In 
fact, she stated, the most important feature of the human rights bodies is the right 
of an individual to me a petition with them. 
Professor Wedgwood offered several suggestions for improving the work of the 
ad hoc war crimes tribunals. First, indictments should be structured to allow a 
speedy triaL The charges against Milosevic might have been tried in separate parts 
in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo, instead of the four-year trial in the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICfY) during which both the pre-
siding judge and the defendant passed away. Second, international justice should 
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not be segregated bytribuna1; she obselVed that it is unfortunate the ICfY declined 
to share evidence from Serb military archives with the International Court of Jus-
tice in the latter's adjudication of the Srebrenica genocide case. Third, it is impor-
tant that cases be tried against defendants from all ethnic communities in a civil 
conflict, so that there is no misplaced imputation of bias. The failure of the Rwanda 
tribunal to try any cases against members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the 
Tutsi armed forces , instead remitting them to local justice authorities controlled by 
the Kagame government, was an unfortunate event . Fourth, political organs are 
not well suited as the locus for war crimes investigations. In particular, the con-
ducting of investigations of war crime allegations by the UN Secretary-General's 
office or the Human Rights Council may be problematic because oflimited fact-
finding capacity and their daily immersion in politics. 
Closing Address 
Professor Emeritus Yoram Dinstein of Tel Aviv University and the U.S. Naval War 
College's Stockton Professor of International Law during academic years 1999-
2000 and 2002-3 delivered the dosing address. Professor Dinstein addressed five 
main areas: the definition ofNlAC, thresholds in armed conflicts, jus in bello, inter-
vention and interaction . 
Professor Dinstein defined a NlAC as a conflict taking place within the borders 
of a single State, carried out between the central government of that State and orga-
nized armed groups, or, there being no effective government , between organized 
armed groups fighting each other. A NlAC can spill over across the borders and 
start another NIAC in a second country, as happened in the Great Lakes region of 
Africa. Still, the idea (endorsed by the Supreme Court of the United States) that a 
NIAC can be global is oxymoronic. 
Next, Professor Dinstein pointed out that there were three thresholds in armed 
conflicts: two for NlACs and one for lAC, plus a sublevel of sporadic and isolated 
violence (e.g., riots) that is below the first threshold, and thus law enforcement in 
nature. The first threshold ofNlACs is established by Common Article 3 of the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949. This famous provision (which reflects customary in-
ternational law) does not spell out what conditions have to be met for the first 
threshold to be crossed. The Appeals Chamber of the lcrY, in the 1995 Tadic case 
added the element that the violence must be "protracted." 
The second threshold of NIACs is set up by AP II of 1977, which requires the 
exercise of control by an organized armed group over a part of the territory, en-
abling it to carry out sustained and concerted military operations. Professor 
Dinstein indicated that this requirement makes the distinction between a NlAC 
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and forms of conflict not amounting to a NIAC much dearer: sustained and con-
certed military operations are the antonym of sporadic and isolated violence. The 
acid test of control of some terri tory explains the difference, for instance, between 
the then-current internal situations in Libya and Syria. In Libya (not counting the 
foreign intervention by fiat of the Security Council), there was no doubt a NlAC 
inasmuch as the insurgents exercised control over vast tracts ofland. By contrast, 
the violence in Syria remained below the threshold- notwithstanding its great 
intensity and the fact that it was protracted-because no part of the territory was 
under the control of any insurgent organized armed group. 
The third threshold means that the armed confli ct amounts to an lAC, and this 
denotes that two or more States are pitted against each other. 
Professor Dinstein then focused on the jus i" bello in NlAC, noting that while 
there is a very remarkable trend in treaty law of growing convergence between the 
jus in bello applicable in lACs and that in NlAC, there cannot be a full merger of the 
law in the two types of armed conflict. He indicated that there are at least three in-
surmountable obstacles to such merger: (a) the domestic law will always consider 
insurgents to be traitors and therefore they cannot be accorded the status of prison-
ers of war by the government of the State (absent recognition of belligerency); (b) 
neutrality is not an issue, as there is only one State embroiled in a NlAC; and (c) the 
whole body of law relating to belligerent occupation is irrelevant to NlACs since 
neither the government nor the insurgents can be in belligerent occupation of their 
own land. There are additional, less compelling problems relating to the legality of 
certain means and methods of warfare, e.g., the legality of particular weapons and 
blockades. 
The issue of intervention relates to military assistance requested from, or of-
fered by, a foreign country when a NIAC is going on. International law permits for-
eign countries to extend military assistance to the State combating insurgents. If 
and when the foreign country does so, the armed conflict remains a NlAC, despite 
the participation of foreign troops in the hostilities, inasmuch as the fo reign troops 
are not battling another State. However, if the foreign troops are deployed against 
the government, the armed conflict automatically crosses the third threshold and 
becomes an lAC. Moreover, even when the foreign troops arrive at the request of 
the government, consent to their presence can be withdrawn at any time. Once 
consent is withdrawn by the government, the foreign fo rces must leave. Failure to 
do so will result in the situation becoming an lAC. 
The last issue Professor Dinstein addressed is interaction. He first indicated that 
it must be appreciated that an armed conflict can coexist with the law enforcement 
paradigm. Criminal activities do not cease when an armed conflict (either a NIAC 
or an lAC) breaks out. Indeed, usually crime rises in wartime, if only because there 
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are numerous new crimes (such as black market activities or trading with the en-
emy). Ordinary crimes, even in the course of an armed conflict. are governed not 
by the jus in bello b ut by domestic criminal law, subject to the precepts of intern a-
tional human rights. Second. a NlAC can segue into an lAC; foreign intervention 
on behalf of insurgents is a prime example. But an lAC can also be the outcome of 
the implosion of a State torn apart by a NlAC and the continuation of the hostilities 
between several new sovereign States created on its ruins. Obviously. as far as fight-
ers in the field are concerned. it may not always be easy to detect at what exact point 
a NlAC has morphed into an lAC (the situation in Bosnia in 1992 showed that lack 
of clarity in a graphic manner). It is therefore easier to analyze the situation when 
there has been an intervening period of time; for instance, Eritrea first rebelled suc-
cessfully against Ethiopia in a NIAC. and then. several years later, started an lAC 
against the same country. Third, the reverse is also true: lACs can turn into NIACs. 
Thus, the lAC between the American-led coalition and the Baathist regime in Iraq 
came to a successful end, and the fighting that continues in Iraq is today no more 
than a NlAC. Fourth. a NIAC and an lAC can be waged concurrently in the same 
country. The best illustration is Afghanistan in 2001, where there was a NlAC be-
tween the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. and (starting in October of that year) 
a separate lAC between the United States (supported by its allies) and the Taliban. 
Fifth, as indicated by General Ferrer with respect to the Philippines. there may even 
be several unrelated NlACs going on in the same country simultaneously, where 
different organized armed groups fight the same central government while having 
diverse-and perhaps clashing-aims. All this can cause confusion. especially 
since governments are often "in denial," reversing the thresholds. That is to say. 
when governments are engaged in an lAC. they tend to claim that the armed con-
flict is no more than a NIAC. When they are caught in a NlAC, they are inclined to 
maintain that the violence is sporadic and below the NIAC threshold. 
Professor Dinstein concluded by recognizing that times are changing and that 
NlAC law must change with them. 
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